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This thesis considers password security guidelines used in current environments and stipulates
that  password  requirements  force  users  to  create  and  use  passwords  which  are  easy  for
computers to guess but hard for humans to remember.
The thesis begins by exploring a number of the most prevalent methods of illicitly obtaining
passwords in an attempt to design an experimental method to test the notion of weak password
distribution. Password cracking techniques are discussed, as well as less technical methods.
Then the topic shifts into password security  research,  attempting to learn information about
password security guidelines, entropy and length in relation to a password's level of security
and, finally, the dangers of password reuse in a society where mass information systems are
linked. Before the experiment begins, the author examines a number of passwords obtained
from a social networking site to show how many flawed passwords are allowed by even today's
advanced systems.
An experiment was then planned, in which a number of password cracking methods were used
against a server in order to determine how large a threat password cracking is to a typical user.
Monitoring software was used to watch network traffic in order to discover whether such traffic is
obvious.
The results of the experiment show that password cracking techniques and technology have
evolved far faster than password security guidelines and that entropy in the form of length is the
strongest  method of  securing  passwords.  The thesis  gives  a  number  of  updated  password
guidelines in order to prevent access via illicit means.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (OR) SYMBOLS
Entropy Entropy, in information theory terms, generally means 
disorder or uncertainty. As an example we can use the 
Bernoulli process in checking a coin toss results. If the coin 
is fair (has an equal chance of coming up heads and tails) 
then it has the maximum possible entropy because it is the 
most difficult to predict the next outcome. If the coin tends 
towards heads (i.e. It is not a fair coin) then the entropy 
reduces.
CPU Central Processing Unit - Central Processing Units are 
problematic when it comes to rapid calculation. This is 
because a CPU has 2-8 cores to be used in calculation while
GPUs contain hundreds that can be used in rapid 
calculations in parallel
GPU Graphics Processing Unit - GPUs are the main component of
graphics cards used in personal computers. Due to the 
highly parallel structure they are far more effective than 
CPUs when it comes to rapid calculation. For this reason 
they are used in calculation systems such as password 
cracking and bitcoin mining.
SQL Structured Query Language is a language used to 
manipulate and manage data stored in a relational database 
management system. 
MySQL MySQL is one of the most used relational database 
management system.
ARP spoofing ARP spoofing is the act of sending false (or spoofed) ARP 
packets onto a network with the intention of confusing the 
ARP process.
SQL Injection An attack in which partial SQL commands are injected using 
database entry forms.
Hash A hash is a mathematical function that is practically 
impossible to invert, and thus used to store sensitive 
information.
Salting The act of adding random bits to stored password databases
in order to prevent dictionary attacks or rainbow tables.
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm, a commonly used hashing function.
TCP Transmission Control Protocol, a core protocol within the 
Internet Protocol Suite. It is used to provide structured, error 
checked and reliable connections.
ARP Address Resolution Protocol is used for the resolution of 
network layer addresses into link layer addresses.
Loopback A loopback address is used to route an outgoing signal 
directly back to the sender, usually used to diagnose 
connection issues.
Nmap A network mapping tool.
Metasploit Framework A complete framework for building, transmitting and 
executing exploits on remote systems.
Meterpreter An in-built command line tool within Metasploit Framework, 
giving access to a number of root level tools such as 
dumping encrypted storage.
xHydra A tool used to execute dictionary attacks against online 
services such as SSH.
John the Ripper A tool used to execute dictionary attacks against offline 
resources, such as Windows .sam files and Linux 
passwd/shadow files.
Rainbow Tables Tables containing precalculated hashes used to attack weak 
hashes.
71 INTRODUCTION
Passwords play a significant role in the life of the average user. As the primary
form of gaining access to accounts and services the function of the password
faces  heavy  scrutiny  from  the  IT  community.  While  arguably  more  secure
systems  exist,  such  as  biometrics  or  one-time  passwords,  user-defined
passwords continue to have a nigh-universal role in IT infrastructure. It is not
possible for a person to manage, either personally or professionally, without the
use of user-defined passwords.
Passwords, along with the associated account names, are a way to indicate
who we are online. They are used to control social media, email, banking and a
plethora of other services. As such, user accounts can be seen as our personal
presence on the internet.  As with any method of  personal  identification it  is
vitally important to keep our user accounts safe. A malicious agent obtaining a
username and password is akin to a fraudster gaining access to a person's
banking details and home address. A great deal of damage can be done with
even the smallest of information.
A great  deal  of  password  alternatives  exist.  Hardware  verification,  such  as
security tokens are often used in corporate situations, particularly for delicate
and/or  restricted  network  access.  The  cost  of  such  systems  prevent  wide
spread distribution, however, given that an authority capable of the maintenance
and issuing of such tokens is required. Biometric evaluation, such as finger print
scanning, provides another more secure form of access but in several situations
such measures are impractical due to expense of implementation.
This  thesis  sets  out  to  discuss  the  idea  that  despite  the  prevalence  of  the
user/password  identification  system,  people  rarely  use  passwords  of  any
reliable strength or complexity, instead sticking rigidly to out-dated guidelines
which make passwords difficult for people to remember but easy for computers
to break.
82 SECURITY RISKS AND RESEARCH
Before a testing system can be designed, we must first stipulate what sort of
testing is required to support the idea that passwords are easy for computers to
guess. The research is divided into two parts. The first part will discuss ways to
gain  access,  either  by  cracking  a  password  or  other  (technical  and  non-
technical) means. The second portion will explore the password use of general
users, and the guidelines that dictate their choice of passwords.
2.1 Methods of cracking
A great deal of methods exist for gaining access to systems by bypassing the
standard  security  settings.  These methods may  range  from executing  small
portions of  code using exploits  on the vulnerable machine to gain complete
control  via  backdoors  or  providing  illicitly  obtained  but  legitimate  login
information.
This  thesis  focuses  on  the  latter,  though  options  about  the  former  will  be
discussed to provide a base for comparison.  We will  touch on the following
areas, although it is by far not a comprehensive list: 
 Phishing and Keylogging
 Man-in-the-Middle attacks
We will  also research a number of options regarding password security and
cracking methodology:
 Dictionary attacks
 Brute Force attacks
 Online vs Offline attacks
92.1.1 Phishing/Keyloggers
A number of attack vectors exist that require little or no technical knowledge of
security  practices  and  protocols.  While  the  use  of  these  attack  vectors  is
beyond the scope of this thesis, their impact on the world of information security
mandates that we discuss them in, at least, a basic form.
Microsoft security pages state that "Social engineering is a technique used by
criminals to gain access to your computer. The purpose of social engineering is
usually to secretly install spyware or other malicious software or to trick you into
handing  over  your  passwords  or  other  sensitive  financial  and  personal
information." [1]
This practice, often known as Phishing,  follows several  different  methods.  A
common technique heavily used in the UK between 2005 and 2008 was known
as Phone Phishing where a group or  individual  would contact  a  person via
phone and claim to be a trusted company such as a bank. They would go on to
claim they had found problems with a bank account and ask for various details. 
More technical Phishing attacks may include imitation of official communication,
again from a bank or other trusted source asking for usernames, passwords or
credit card details.
Link manipulation is a common technique used in these forms of attack. For
example, the attackers may use sub-domains or a misspelled URL in order to
make it appear as though communication is official. 
The attackers may even go so far as to forge a copy of the companies website
or  using cross  site  scripting direct  a  target  to  sign  in  using  their  own bank
service where everything may appear to be correct. One such attack was used
in 2006 to attack the Paypal service.
Keyloggers pose a different threat altogether. A keylogger is a piece of software
designed to be installed on a computer through illicit means. Either a backdoor
or a trojan horse would be a perfectly suitable delivery method though many
others  exist.  This  program is  usually  set  to  execute  silently  on  startup  and
capture every keystroke made by the target machine.
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An example of  such a program is  inputlog though this  software is  used for
research purposes. Examining data from a keylogger can provide user-names,
passwords,  access  to  sensitive  correspondence  and  other  breaches  of
confidentiality and security. 
Hardware keyloggers also exist, acting as a bridge between the keyboard and
computer. These are practically undetectable by software prevention methods
though they have an obvious increased risk of discovery.
2.1.2 Man-in-the-Middle attacks
Man-in-the-Middle attacks are an attack vector in which traffic going between
two  hosts  is  intercepted.  Imagine  a  situation  in  which  a  user's  computer,
hereafter  Host-PC connects  to  the  server,  hereafter  Server-A. The  setup  is
demonstrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Man-in-the-Middle attack setup
Host-PC connects to Server-A and Server-A requests login information.  In a
normal  situation,  this  information  goes  from  Host-PC  to  Server-A  without
incident. During a Man-in-the-Middle attack (displayed in Figure 1), the attacker
(Attacker) positions himself between the Host-PC and Server-A with the intent
of maliciously 'sniffing' network traffic. There are several methods of doing such,
but for this example, we will assume ARP spoofing has been used.
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Attacker sends spoofed ARP packets to the Host-PC, claiming to be Server-A.
Similarly, it sends spoofed ARP packets to Server-A, this time claiming to be
Host-PC. As such, traffic destined for Host-PC from Server-A is instead sent to
Attacker, as is all traffic meant for Server-A from Host-PC. In this situation, when
Host-PC  sends  the  login  details  'User=Host  Password=applesux'  the
information goes through Attacker-PC.
Depending on the attackers motives several situations can occur. A Denial-of-
Service attack can be implemented at  this  point,  by simply dropping all  the
associated  network  packets.  This  can  be  used  to  give  the  impression  that
Server-A's services are down, especially if other network traffic is forwarded as
normal.
Alternatively, if the attacker is sniffing packets 'passively', he can observe traffic
as it passes. In this situation, provided there is no encryption on the traffic, he
would see the username and password as it passes over his connection before
the packets are forwarded as normal.
In an active setting, the attacker might want to modify traffic as it goes. For
example, after the legitimate login attempt, User-PC might send a 'message'
saying “I am home at 16 today.” The attacker might alter this to say “I am home
at 14” for example.
An  article  on  lifehacker  also  notes  that  “A man-in-the-middle  attack  can  be
successful only when the attacker forms a mutual authentication between two
parties.  Most  cryptographic protocols  always provide some form of  endpoint
authentication, specifically to block MITM attacks on users.” [2]
While  Man-in-the-Middle  attacks  are  an interesting  situation to  consider  and
have a great deal of literature devoted to them, this thesis is not one of them. As
such, Man-in-the-Middle attacks will be discussed only theoretically.
2.1.3 Brute Force attacks
Brute  force  attacks  rely  on  being  both  a  simple  and comprehensive  attack.
Instead of  exploiting vulnerabilities  in  software or  networking systems,  brute
force attempts to make legitimate login attempts until one is accepted as correct
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and access is gained. Initial research into a system during penetration testing
can often provide a list of usernames, which can be used in conjunction with
these attacks.
Such attacks work by literally testing every keyspace for each possible value,
attempting upwards of millions of tries a second until the password is broken.
Attacks such as this leave obvious traces. Server memory usage may bloat
because of having to serve such a large number of login requests.  Network
traffic will certainly be very obvious with so many login attempts.
As such, Brute Force attacks are better off running offline.
Brute force attacks rely heavily on hardware. Like Bitcoin mining, Brute Force
attacks  require  high  numbers  of  parallel  calculations  made.  Therefore,
processes that run on GPUs rather than CPU-based calculation are far faster.
Later we will discuss a machine created to execute Brute Force attacks.
2.1.4 Dictionary attacks
Dictionary  attacks  are  a  compromise  to  using  a  full  brute  force  approach.
Instead of trying every possible keyspace, a 'dictionary' file is used as the basis
for cracking. A dictionary file is a plaintext file containing passwords separated
by lines. Dictionary files can be many megabytes in size, holding hundreds of
thousands of passwords.
Hardware  makes  far  less  difference  in  Dictionary  attacks.  No  calculation  is
required. Instead read speed is the deciding factor, but with little information to
read it mostly relies on network traffic. Obvious attempts are still easy to stop
with a dictionary attack.
The trade-off for the increased speed is that only common passwords are able
to be cracked by dictionary attacks.
Some programs allow for 'mask' attacks which apply common replacements to
letters  and  numbers  in  order  to  create  a  hybrid  between  brute  force  and
dictionary  attacks.  This  possibly  provides  the  best  compromise  between
efficiency of speed and the reliability of results.
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2.1.5 Online vs Offline attacks
Online attacks refer to attacks launched using existing network connections.
Attacks such as these have obvious drawbacks. Online attacks will consistently
challenge  password-protected  systems  with  login  attempts.  As  such  each
attempt will be treated as legitimate. Each attempt will display normal network
traffic. Normal attempts at login might be considered as 1 to 4 tries. Anything
higher  raises  a  red  flag,  and online  attacks  rely  on  the  ability  to  run  make
between tens of thousands and millions of attempts. 
Another concern is that online attacks are subject to a great deal of security
measures. IP blacklist software can be used to stop connection attempts from
malicious hosts, who can be dicerned from an abnormal number of connection
requests.
Furthermore, network bandwidth could be a limiting factor. While a dedicated
password-cracking machine could make millions of attempts a second, network
traffic restrictions might limit that number to thousands, perhaps even hundreds.
Offline attacks are much more powerful. When a machine can be dedicated to
cracking  a  stored  hash,  the  speeds  attained  are  far  higher  than  the  online
counterpart. The great disadvantage of offline cracking is in that a password file
needs to be locally stored, and the logistics of obtaining such a file implies that
the attacker already has a level of privileged access to the remote server he is
attempting to penetrate.
This is not always the case. Some networks may have a centralized password
server, and as such this would be a high priority goal during a penetration test.
If  one is  able to  obtain  the password file,  an offline attack will  be far  more
powerful.
2.2 Password security research
The next step in the research process is to move onto the area of password
security, both theoretical and practical. The area of password security is such an
expansive field that much of it lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Here we will
research the following areas:
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 Password Security Guidelines
 Length / Entropy
 Reuse
 Examples from website X
2.2.1 Password security guidelines
Password security and the role it plays in the professional and personal lives of
the public has always been a source of concern and controversy. Symantec, a
prominent IT security company, outlines[3] the points of a good password as:
 No personal information
 No dictionary words, proper nouns or foreign language words
 Password length between 6 and 9 characters
 Uses  all  possible  character  sets.  Uppercase,  Lowercase,  Numbers,
Symbols.
The summary of the thesis uses the standard IT theory that a good password is
easy to remember, but hard to guess. They also warn against bad practices,
such as writing down or sharing passwords.
The statement from Symantec in question was written is 2002. Similarly, the
support pages for Google states that passwords require a minimum of 8 letters.
This shows that over the last 13 years, while password cracking techniques and
machines  have  been  improving  and,  behind  the  scenes,  password  storage
hashes have also been improving, users have no additional responsibility.
This  stagnation  in  user-end  security  policies  is  echoed  across  most  of  the
popular  Internet  services.  Facebook's  support  page  states  that  the  service
requires a minimum of 6 letters[4].  This means that  one of  the most popular
services in the world has the same password security requirements as a user
from 2002.  Neither  service,  Gmail  or  Facebook,  mandates  a  90-day  period
between password changes as is a standard of good practice in IT security.
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2.2.2 Length / Entropy
“Effective  evaluation  of  password  strength  requires  a  proper  metric.  One
possible metric is information entropy” has been stated in a paper presented to
the 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy[5].
Eight characters is the minimum length for a password to be secure if it takes
advantage of all the potential character types. With 26 possibilities from lower
case, 26 from uppercase, 10 from numbers and 12 from the full set of symbols
this means every keyspace has 74 possible entries.
Note: ` ~ ! @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) _ - + = { } [ ] \ | : ; " ' < > , . ? / A number of these
cannot  be used with  password systems. A total  of  32 symbols are present.
However given the prevalence of disallowing symbols which could cause issues
such as SQL injection, we can use 12 as the number of available symbols.
From  this  we  can  determine  that  the  possible  combinations  for  an  8-letter
password is 74^8. This means there are just under 900 trillion combinations of
passwords. At 2 million guesses per second this would still  take 14 years to
complete.
However,  at  the  Passwords^12  Security  Conference  in  December  of  2012
Jeremi M. Gosney gave a presentation that stipulated password crackers need
more power. He went on to introduce a system that contained 25 AMD Radeon
GPUs[6].
Ignoring bandwidth constraints, against the LM Hash, this system was capable
of putting out 20,000,000,000 password attempts a second. Using this system
on  the  8-character  password  with  74  possible  entries  would  lead  to  the
password being broken in just over 12 hours.
Limiting  oneself  to  only  a  subset  of  the  available  symbols  can  dramatically
reduce  the  strength  of  the  password.  Using  the  alphanumeric  subset  of  62
characters (with a speed of 2 million attempts per second), the crack would take
three years to complete. Using only lowercase and numbers the subset is only
32  characters  and  would  complete  within  6  days.  Against  a  more  powerful
system, such passwords would hold up for mere seconds.
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Length  can  serve  to  offset  this  issue  somewhat.  Each  additional  character
space that needs to be calculated increases the entropy of a password. Even
the addition of a single extra letter gives an additional exponent equal to the
number of characters in the subset used.
For  example:  Increasing  the  32-character  subset's  password  length  to  10
instead of 8 increases the cracking time (at 2 million guesses per second) to
over 17 years. 
When we increase the length of a password using 74 possible characters to 12,
we see such an exponential  increase in the cracking time that even Jeremi
Gosney's system would need 4750 years to break the password when working
against MD5 hashes.
From this,  it  may be possible  to  conclude that  password length rather  than
entropy  of  the  character  space  subset  used  is  a  more  important  factor  in
password security. We will aim to test this in the thesis.
2.2.3 Reuse
Given network restrictions on attacks password reuse is likely a more serious
issue than password-cracking. Take the following example.
A user with the ID of 10T uses a password for his Gmail account that is very
secure, 19 alphanumeric/symbolic characters. For all intents and purposes this
password is uncrackable. However using a keylogger an enterprising hacker
has obtained this information. He finds that the Gmail  account  is merely for
collecting spam from other websites. Browsing through the emails can offer up
usernames for such websites.
When this 19-character password is reused, the purpose of high entropic levels
is rendered moot. Our enterprising hacker has obtained access to all of User ID
10T's information, including an official email address. Our enterprising hacker
then  creates  an  attack  using  various  potential  username  schemes  and
password variants. Using this one password, this attacker has gained access to
a company's secure network.
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Research conducted at Microsoft[7] has some interesting results to share on this
subject. “Among our interesting findings is how large a role web passwords play
in users lives. The average user has 6.5 passwords, each of which is shared
across  3.9  different  sites.  Each  user  has  about  25  accounts  that  require
passwords,  and  types  an  average  of  8  passwords  per  day.”Examples  from
website X
On  June  6,  2012  there  was  a  dump  of  passwords  from  a  well-known
professional networking site containing 24132 passwords. The Python script in
Table 1 was made to take an average of a selection of passwords.
Table 1. Line length averaging script written in Python
total = 0
count = 0
file = open('passwords', 'r')
for line in file:
        print(line)
        stringlength= line.__len__() - 1 
        total = stringlength + total
        print stringlength  
        print(total)
        count = count + 1
        print(count)
        print
        print
average = float(total) / float(count)
print average
First, we took a random sample of 200 passwords, finding them to be 9.095
characters in length. Then we tested the script against the entire file and came
up  to  9.279  characters  long.  While  on  initial  look,  these  lengths  make  the
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passwords seem strong, looking at the three samples from those provided in
Table 2 reveals otherwise.
Table 2. Three password samples
jjmsjjm breaksbreaks shallyqian
J0n0th0n 20FA89 Go4number1
Lausebengel M1ll1ona1re Shoey2
Poeldijk1 Chingerel0 Ca4350799
8fmabg7k Bigtoby1 Hels1nki
Komigjen1 class_a Ca55anova
sunyingjie 280275s10810 Work4kids
Leshen7 Houghto1 Shanesmith
Our2boys Guldsko
15MAI1984 Colepaige1
ANNAEMILIA choco24nuts
nmstnmst not4everyone
From  the  32  passwords  listed  several  are  emboldened.  These  represent
remarkably weak passwords to have been accepted on such a website. They
are either examples of dangerously small passwords or passwords containing a
single subset of characters from the possibilities.
Three  passwords  have  been  indented.  These  passwords,  280275s10810,
15MAI1984  and  Hels1nki,  initially  seem  strong.  However,  let  us  look  more
closely at these individually.
280275s10810 - The first six characters of this password are clearly a date of
birth.  The possibility  exists,  with  mask  attacks,  to  crack  this  password  very
simply by applying the following rules:
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The  first  six  numbers  are  a  date  of  birth.  Therefore  each  has  a  potential
keyspace of 10.
The last six are alphanumeric with no upper case.
Therefore:
(10^6)+(32^6)  == 1074741824 potential  passwords.  Our 2-million-guesses-a-
second system would have this cracked in just 9 minutes. This is the reason
using a date of birth in a password is bad practice.
Hels1nki  -  This  password  reveals  a  lot  about  the  user.  A person using  this
password  is  most  likely  Finnish  and  more  often  than  not  living  in  Helsinki.
Replacing a I for a 1 and capitalization of the first letter is very common practice
in passwords. We can stipulate the following:
(72^1)+(32^7)  ==  34359738440  passwords.  Our  system  would  break  this
password in just less than 5 hours.
15MAI1984 also reveals a great deal about the user. Obviously, a date of birth,
the spelling of the month reveals that the user is most likely French. Just as a
username should give no hints to a password, the password should similarly
give no hints to the user.
Further examples of weak passwords in this way can be seen from the list as
well in the example of Work4kids, Shanesmith (which is potentially just a name)
and many others. Browsing through the passwords demonstrates that almost all
of them have a weakness in this way, which probably contributed to the fact that
they were cracked when leaked. Further contributing to the fact was the way
they were hashed in unsalted SHA-1.
Some cryptographic hashes make use of  'salting'.  In  cryptography,  a  salt  is
random data added to a password hashing function with the intent to create
extra keyspaces and/or entropy within the password. It is important to note that,
when using a dictionary attack against a single password, salting will have no
impact. However, it does make it more difficult to crack a list of passwords. Take
the following example:
When cracking a  password list,  an attacker  would compute  a hash attempt
(hereafter  known as Attempt-1.)  The chance of  Attempt-1 coming up with  a
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match increase for the number of passwords in the file. However (if using early
Unix implementation of 12-bit salt containing 4096 possible salt values), then an
attacker has to process Salt-1-through-4096 for each attempt. Attempt-1+Salt1,
Attempt-1+Salt2, Attempt-1+Salt3 through to Attempt-1+Salt4096. 
Thus salting prevents the 'reusing' of hashes when attempting to break large
lists of passwords.
Given that Rainbow Tables use large lists of pre-computed hashes for common
passwords, salting also poses an obstacle for their use.
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3 PASSWORD STRENGTH TESTING
The testing phase aims to prove that password security requirements as largely
inaccurate or obsolete. A testing system will be setup wherein two computers
are connected to a network and a number of attack attempts will be launched. 
Two testing systems were initially  considered.  The first  system connected a
server to the attacking machine directly, each NIC card cabled to each other
and an address scheme designated. This setup would maintain the purity of the
experiment, given the absence of outside traffic. However, it was decided that
this system's isolated nature would provide improper results and that a new
system would be designed with maintaining regular traffic.
This second proposed system added both the server and attacker machine to
an already existing, populated network with light traffic. Such a setup removes
the purity of the experiment but provides additional relevance to a real-world
setup.  Interpretation of  the  network traffic  is  likely  to  be a large part  of  the
results of such a test and, as such, keeping the experiment as close to real-
world scenarios as possible.
Monitoring software for the network would have to be used. This is due to the
fact that an obvious attack is likely to be noticed by even the most basic of
Intrusion  Prevention  Systems  such  as  those  found  in  home  routers.  The
monitoring software watched for changes in network traffic, as well as provide
examples of genuine connection attempts for comparison.
A selection of programs were used to provide different sources and attacks. A
dictionary  attack  uses  the  provided  wordlist  to  attack  systems.  Brute  force
attacks  will  be  demonstrated  also  to  a  point.  However,  due  to  the  time
requirements  of  in-depth  brute  force  attacks  they  can  only  be  theoretically
discussed.
In order to prove that password security requirements have advanced at a far
slower rate than password cracking technology and techniques, several factors
need to be monitored during the testing phase.
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While offline attacks of a captured hash are out of the scope of this thesis,
examples of the speed and detectability of such methods will be discussed for
the comparison between online and offline attacks.
3.1.1 Testing System
The testing  system was  attached to  a  network  in  order  to  ensure  accurate
conditions as close to real-world as possible. Two computers were used based
on the specifications provided in Table 3.
Table 3. Testing computer specifications
Attacker PC Server PC
CPU Pentium D Pentium D
RAM 2GB 1GB
HDD 160GB 80GB / 160GB
NIC speed 100mbps 100mbps
IP Address 192.168.1.83 192.168.1.85
GPU Radeon X550 N/A
OS Kali Linux Debian (Virtual Machine)
The addition of a graphics card in Attacker PC may seem arbitrary but, as brute
force attacks require parallel calculation, the GPU is far better than the CPU.
Given the exponential increase in processing power of GPUs since the release
of the Radeon X550, it is safe to assume any parallel calculations will be faster
under today's systems.
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The systems were appended to an existing network as documented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Documentation of the testing network
The Standards of Good Practice for IT Security[8] states that ”Network activity
should  be  monitored  using  a  range  of  techniques”  in  order  to  ”Assess  the
performance  of  the  network,  reduce  the  likelihood  of  network  overload  and
detect  potential  or  actual  malicious  intrusions.”  As  such,  the  connections
between the Attacker-PC at 192.168.1.83 and the Server-PC at 192.168.1.85
would be monitored using Wireshark.
The  Server-PC  would  attempt  to  simulate  an  access  server  in  a  working
environment.  It  would  have  minimal  security  features  (given  that  this  thesis
discusses security of passwords, rather than preventitive measures.) A number
24
of user accounts were created, each with incrementally secure passwords and
higher permissions depending on their role inside the virtual environment. They
were assigned the attributes outlined in Table 4.
Table 4. User and password setup values
Name User Name Role Password Strength
Thomas Jensen Tjensen Head of IT M3OinPiG-WttfN Strong
Alex Donald adonald IT department There1sN0Spo0n Fairly Strong
Suki Richards Srichards IT intern Weakp1 Weak
Claire Porter Cporter CEO MediuMPa Medium
Jean Russell Jrussel Accounting weakpa Very weak
3.1.2 Test Log
In order to maintain some resemblence of authenticity with real world conditions
the testing was divided into four stages. Information gathering, target probing,
penetration and thesisation.
”Network  discovery  uses  a  number  of  methods  to  discover  active  and
responding hosts on a network, identify weaknesses, and learn how the network
operates. Both passive (examination) and active (testing) techniques exist for
discovering devices on a network. Passive techniques use a network sniffer to
monitor network traffic and record the IP addresses of the active hosts, and can
report  which  ports  are  in  use  and  which  operating  systems  have  been
discovered on the network.”[9]
3.1.3 Information Gathering
The information gathering stage began by analyzing the network. To do this we
used the program NMAP to do a primary ping sweep of the network using the
following command:
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nmap -sP 192.168.1.1-254
This allows us to get a general layout of the network and confirm that the hosts
are set up as in our network diagram. Attacker-PC pings at 192.168.1.83 and
the  loopback  interface  on  127.0.0.1.  Server-PC  accepts  ping  requests  on
192.168.1.85. The network was functioning as expected.
We proceed with the information gathering phase by running a comprehensive
scan  in  NMAP.  We  begin  with  a  TCP connect  scan.  This  scan  works  by
attempting  to  initiate  the  standard  networking  three  way  handshake.  It  is  a
graceful attack, in that it opens and closes connections properly and avoids the
risk of flooding the server with connection requests. The command used is the
following:
nmap -sT -p- -pN 192.168.1.85
 
Figure 3. Nmap command output
Figure 3 shows that the SSH system is open and on a predictable port. In a
business environment there would be other scans to run. For example, a more
stable scan might be considered, for example the SYN scan. It is faster than a
TCP scan because SYN scans fail  to complete all  three steps of the 3-way
handshake used in TCP connections. Another consideration might be to check
for open UDP ports. One might even consider sending more agressive scanning
attacks. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the TCP information gathering
phase is suitable.
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3.1.4 Online Attack Phase
Before we continued on to online attacks, we started Wireshark running on the
Server-PC in order to view network traffic. We do this in hope of noticing the
difference between standard network chatter, legitimate traffic and erroneous
traffic that is likely an attack. We then use xHydra to attempt a dictionary attack.
As thesised by Figure 4, we target the Server-PC on the SSH protocol running
on Port 22. We will specify a username with a weak password (JRussell) and
run a small password file through to check the network traffic.
Figure 4. xHydra dictionary attack setup
A dictionary file must be specified in order for xHydra to run. The dictionary file
in use is over 3 megabytes in size and contains over 300,000 passwords. There
has always been something of a trade-off when it comes to dictionary files. Too
large a file makes for slow cracking. Some dictionary files exist in excess of 1
gigabyte in size. However too small a file can severely limit the number systems
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that will be vulnerable to the file.The password-cracking program, xHydra, runs
at approximately 180 tries a minute, three password attempts a second. This
speed is dramatically lower than our earlier estimates and will take many hours
to run through even a small scale dictionary attack. 
Figure 5. xHydra Dictionary attack speeds
From this, we may also assume that brute force attacks will be limited in the
same way as dictionary attacks. They will send similar traffic, only substantially
more  packets  will  need  to  be  sent  to  fascilitate  the  attack's  effective  and
exaustive process. As such, brute force attacks should be considered only when
attacking offline passwords in order to make use of the technique.
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The network traffic made by this form of attack is very obvious as shown in
Figure 6.
Figure 6. Erroneous SSH traffic
As demonstrated by the traffic in Figure 6, the attack launched is sending very
similar sequences of packets over a short time frame. Until a correct password
is given, no connection can be made. No key exchange is initiated between the
two machines. The system is simply flooded with login requests. On a larger
scale than our sample, the difference becomes even clearer as the software
sends thousands of these erroneous messages. For comparison, in Figure 7,
there is a legitimate SSH login.
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Figure 7. Genuine SSH login attempt
Attempting to gain access to a user account in this method, using a dictionary,
relies on the fact that the correct password is inside the password file. Brute
force is a more comprehensive approach. However, based on network speeds,
SSH protocol login times, and the obvious nature of network traffic, an online
attack is clearly a poor choice in this situation. Instead we will move onto using
John the Ripper to attempt an offline attack.
3.1.5 Offline Attack Phase
 ”The  process  of  cracking  Linux  and  OS  X  passwords  is  much  the  same
[Windows] a few slight modifications. Linux systems do not use an SAM file to
store the password hashes. Rather the encrypted Linux password hashes are
contained in a file called the “shadow” file which is located at /etc/shadow.” [10]
This approach is more indepth, as it requires access to an encrypted password
file. The file in question is the shadow file of the Unix operating system. Linux
stores user and password data in two files, /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow. Using
this  method,  while  any  user  can  request  their  login  information  from
/etc/passwd, only the root account can access /etc/shadow where the encrypted
passwords are stored.
Normally  the  /etc/shadow file  is  protected  and  difficult  to  access.  We  used
Metasploit Framework in order to exploit the system and it's inbuilt Meterpreter
in order to dump the files. Metepreter's thesisation [11]  states ”Meterpreter, short
for  The  Meta-Interpreter,  is  an  advanced  payload  that  is  included  in  the
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Metasploit  Framework.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  complex  and  advanced
features  that  would  otherwise  be  tedious to  implement  purely  in  assembly.”
However, Metasploit Framework is a complex topic, far beyond the scope of this
thesis. This the methodology of these attacks will not be discussed.
Here is an example of the /etc/password file:
cporter:x:1006:1006:Claire,Porter,1,2,3:/home/cporter:/bin/bash
jrussell:x:1007:1007:Jean,Russell,1,2,3:/home/jrussell:/bin/bash
And an example of the /etc/shadow file:
cporter:$1$8RjArBL6$0beM80wppQxcGdGA9WisQ.:16170:0:99999:7:::
jrussell:$1$QCTLtFy4$hUxTuxL6HrGc0V0hW9qp7.:16170:0:99999:7:::
John  the  Ripper's  unshadow  command  combines  the  /etc/password  and
/etc/shadow files to their original form. The form below shows examples of the
files before and the combined output file. The command issued is as follows:
unshadow ServerPass ServerShadow > ServerUnshadow.txt
The results of the command are as follows:
cporter:
$1$8RjArBL6$0beM80wppQxcGdGA9WisQ.:1006:1006:Claire,Porter,1,2,3:
/home/cporter:/bin/bash
jrussell:
$1$QCTLtFy4$hUxTuxL6HrGc0V0hW9qp7.:1007:1007:Jean,Russell,1,2,3:
/home/jrussell:/bin/bash
This new file, ServerUnshadow.txt was in the correct format to apply John the
Ripper's dictionary attack. The command issued:
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john –word_list=cain.txt ServerUnshadow.txt
The attack this time is much faster. Running at over 16000 attempts per second
(as demonstrated in Figure 8), a much larger password file (in excess of 300
megabytes) was used and in a far shorter time. Additionally, the GPU can be
used instead of the CPU to dramatically increase cracking speed.
Figure 8. Offline attack speed comparison
It  is  this  result  that  lends  credence  to  the  idea  that  password-cracking
requirements have stayed stagnant while cracking techniques have advanced.
Even on a standard processor,  a  password with 8 characters is surprisingly
weak. Sixteen thousand attempts a second would take several years to break
into an 8 character password. However, when running on GPU the dramatic
increase in speeds renders an 8-letter password mostly useless.
At this point in the experiment, brute force options were considered. However
there were several drawbacks that prevented us from running them. Primary
among them was the available hardware. While GPUs do drastically increase
the  speed  of  cracking  passwords,  the  devices  available  in  our  testing
environment would not have provided the required power. The cost of obtaining
such devices was also unfeasible for testing purposes, as for a reliable result,
high end graphics cards would be required.
A second drawback was in the speed of the devices. Running with substandard
hardware, if we could attain 200,000 guesses a second, an 8 letter password
containing only lowercase letters would still take 12 days to run. While this is not
an unreasonable runtime in real world situations, the number of passwords we
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needed to test combined with the complexity made testing brute force methods
impossible.
For the purposes of this thesis, however, we can consider theoretical values.
Brute  force  attacks  can  be  considered  more  effective  but  far  slower  than
dictionary attacks. Both attacks will be subject to similar network traffic when
used online and thus our online results only need consideration when it comes
to dictionary attacks.
Brute  force  attacks  excel  when  it  comes  to  offline  password  cracking  on
dedicated hardware. As such, we can presume that any system designed for
these attacks will provide far better results than our offline dictionary attack.
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4 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results from our testing provide a number of discussion points. 
The initial probe of the system revealed a number of vulnerabilities. Primarily
SSH was running on the native port  of  22.  This  is  considered bad practice
purely due to the fact that the service can be easily detected. Obfuscation is an
important  part  of  network security.  Obscured networks  provide  an additional
level of security beyond technical security measures.
When the SSH service was found to be running on the native port, the decision
of how to attack the target became clear. SSH is a common process, in place
on almost all servers in production environments, as well as a great number of
networking devices. As such, it was a good choice for the attack. However, as
SSH  connections  frequently  use  certificates  in  lieu/addition  to  password
security, it is conceivable that a poor password might not be such a large risk,
especially in a well-secured environment.
The fact that we were also able to use Meterpreter to dump the shadow file also
indicates that this system had security flaws. However, this result is, as was the
use of the Metasploit framework, beyond the scope of this thesis.
Logging the network using Wireshark provided a great deal of insight into online
attacks. Such attacks are obviously erroneous traffic. Any system administrator
with  access  to  network  traffic  information,  for  example  through  intrusion
protection systems or network traffic logs,  should be able to notice such an
attack and blacklist the attacking IP address. Indeed a great deal of software
exists  to  automate  this  process,  such  as  DenyHosts,  the  Linux  package
providing  additional  security  for  SSH  connections  by  limiting  connection
attempts (by default to 4 attempts per minute).
The speed of an online attack also leaves much to be desired. The attacks in
our testing phase were launched on 100 megabyte per second connections
across a closed network. This is a connection far faster than those to which a
standard  user  would  have  access.  Of  course,  faster  connections  exist,  but
offline techniques are clearly far superior in respect to speed and detectability.
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The online  dictionary  attacks  broke  passwords  after  around  three  thousand
attempts, running at less than two hundred tries a minute. Weak or common
passwords are far more likely to be contained in a dictionary file. Length and
entropy  decrease  the  likelihood  of  a  password  being  apparent  or  obvious.
These tests rely purely on a password being inside a relative file, however, and
these dictionary files can be very large, but the same mathematical logic for a
brute force attack applies. A larger password means a larger potential dictionary
file and an exponentially increased attack length. The dictionary attack method
is clearly better suited to attempting to crack a large number of easy passwords,
such as might be dumped from a website.
Offline attacks were far different. They offered better results and an increase in
speed even on low-end hardware. Their potential is clear, for attacking stored
passwords. The difficulty of this attack is in obtaining the protected password
files, usually well-secured on a server, requiring some form of privileged access
before the approach can even be attempted.
Brute force attacks are clearly the most reliable method of getting access to a
password. However, network speed would clearly be a controlling factor in an
online attack.  With modern hardware, the computer would be able to guess
passwords far faster than the login attempt can be made. Indeed, it could be
capable of guessing more passwords than the network can handle. This once
again leads to very obvious traffic that should raise alarms with any system
administrator.
When looking at the theoretical results outlined in Section 2.2.4, it seems clear
that  our  current  password  systems  are  unsatisfactory  with  regards  to  the
guidelines offered to users. Six to ten letters does not provide enough entropy
when faced with modern cracking techniques, even when each possible letter
set is used.
Systems  which  mandate  the  use  of  at  least  two  or  three  of  the  possible
character subsets lead to distinctly more secure passwords than those which do
not.  Should people insist on using passwords easy to remember, such as a
string of  words,  they should be as long as possible.  A word string such as
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dogcatrabbitbirdpigsnake is far more difficult to crack than D21Fx0e3 which is
an example of a short, high entropy password. 
We would suggest the following amended password security guidelines:
 A minimum of 10 letters.  12-15 letters recommended. Each additional
letter adds an exponential increase to password strength
 Use all subsets (a-z, A-Z, 1-0, symbols) as each increases entropic value
of the passwords
 Passwords  should  be  changed  every  90  days  in  order  to  mitigate
keylogger attacks
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